Pedro Lamarão

English translation for this article which was presented in the colloquium Pestilência em Foco in june 2021.

Boyle replaced knowledge by comprehensibility but he did not find in this replacement any guarantee. He argued for it as the cause for intellectual satisfaction — although Bacon had deemed satisfaction a major inducement for the development of prejudices. In one way Boyle did agree with Bacon more than with Decartes (and rightly so): Bacon had claimed that intellectual satisfaction with the theories we have at hand may lead to stagnation. Boyle concluded from this that satisfaction it not enough: we need power too.

The Very Idea of Modern Science, p. 202

It is not enough to be right. It also has to work.

Neil deGrasse Tyson, “Neil deGrasse Tyson teaches scientific thinking and communication”, masterclass.com

In its first number, “The Equinox”, official publication of the A⸫ A⸫, announced itself as “the review of Scientific Illuminism”. What «science» means, what conception of Science applies or is applicable, are questions recurrent in discussions about the Order and its System. In this work, we explore the conception of Science in Scientific Illuminism through an examplary case: the case of eredith Starr.

In his comments on verses 48-52 of chapter 5 of “Liber Cordis Cincti Serpente”, Aleister Crowley discusses what he asserts to be the most dangerous errors that magicians in training can make. To illustrate the problem, he cites the case of Meredith Starr.

(…) he turned up one afternoon and informed me that he had just acquired the power of taking any poison without affecting him. I suggested that I try him out, and he was besotted enough to receive the suggestion joyfully. “Ring up Whineray”, I said to Neuburg, with the aplomb and savoir faire peculiar to the English race, “and tell him to send a boy down at once with ¼ ouce of Strychnine.” Neuburg went to the telephone-and a faint gleam of common sense flashed across Starr’s mind. He asked me if I could not think of something that would be less devastating in its effect in case he had not got the power quite perfect yet. I said yes, I could accommodate him, and fetched 10 grains of Calomel from my medicine case. He placed the tablets in his open left hand and picked them up one by one and swallowed them, on each occasion grinding out between his teeth, with the most horrific groans-which he intended to represent the power of will — “Strength beyond Strength, Pow-wer beyond Pow-wer, Adonai!”. We then proceded to talk about other matters. An hour or so later, he said he would go home, having demonstrated his power over Calomel. I suggestd that perhaps something might happen later on. But he laughed the idea to scorn. He promised, however, to let us know if anything happened after all.

Commentary to Liber 65, chapter 5, verse 48

The story continues reporting on the successive telephone calls from Starr trying to explain the terrible intestinal phenomena which afflicted him during the night. In conclusion, Crowley says:

As I said above, this is an extraordinary case. But the general type constitutes, as a moderate estimate, at least 70% of so-called occult students. Even quite serious aspirants fall into the trap before they are any good. I have to drill them in scepticism and the scientific method of verifying one’s results for months on end.

ibid.

What is the relationship between the two components of this remedy, “scepticism” and “the scientific method of verifyin one’s results”, and how can it help us to form a conception of Science in Scientific Illuminism?

According with the Oxford English Dictionary, «scepticism» means colloquially a certain attitude in relation to some particular branch of science, doubt or incredulity as to the trugh of some assertion or supposed fact, also a disposition to doubt or incredulity in general; philosphically it means the doctrine of the Sceptics, which held the opinion that real knowledge of any kind is unattainable.

In her “Introdução à História da Filosofia,” professor Marilena Chauí conceptualizes the philosophical doctrine of the sceptics:

When we speak of scepticism, it is immediately understood a philosophy which argues in every way to demonstrate that there is no solid basis, no foundation to knowledge or even to belief. The instability of the senses, the plurality of opinions and conventions, the contradictions in logic indicate that neither sensation nor reason can present itself as the framework for knowledge. (…) When, in book IX of “Vitae Philosophorum”, Diogenes Laertius refers to a group of philosophers followers of Phyrro, he writes that “the sceptic philosophers spend their time destroying the dogmas of other schools and never stablishing one that was their own.”

Marilena Chauí, “Introdução à História da Filosofia”, volume 2, pp. 48-49

Crowley gives his understanding of scepticism in “The Soldier and the Hunchback”:

INQUIRY. Let us inquire in the first place: What is Scepticism? The word means looking, questioning, investigating. One must pass by contemptuously the Christian liar’s gloss which interprets “sceptic” as “mocker”; though in a sense it is true for him, since to inquire into Christianity is assuredly to mock at it; but I am concerned to intensify the etymological connotation in several respects. First, I do not regard mere incredulity as necessary to the idea, though credulity is incompatible with it. Incredulity implies a prejudice in favour of a negative conclusion; and the true sceptic should be perfectly unbiassed. (…) Eagerness, intentness, concentration, vigilance — all these I include in the connotation of “sceptic.” (…) I picture the true sceptic as a man eager and alert, his deep eyes glittering like sharp swords, his hands tense with effort as he asks, “What does it matter?”

The Soldier and the Hunchback, section 1

Crowley therefore conceptualizes scepticism characterized no by a doubt that rejects but by a doubt that investigates; the sceptic is eager for knowledge and is not easily satisfied, not letting herself be fooled by illusions; the sceptic investigates keeping herself vigilant to make herself perfectly unbiased. These marks will lead us to a certain conception of Science, as we will see next.

The Encyclopaedia Britannica tells us that «scientific method» denotes the mathematical and experimental technique applied in the sciences. More specifically, it is the technique used to construct and test scientific hypotheses. In popular imagination, Science is a thing made by a class of selected individuals called Scientists, whose practice happens in places called Laboratories, where, through the use of specialized instruments of high precision, Scientific Proofs it is obtained on truth. Despite the enormous controversies induced by the dissection of these conceptions by researchers into the history and philosophy of science, there remains to this day in the popular imagination the idea of a continuous and linear progress towards trutuh whose irrefutability is obtained through the special mechanism called “scientific method”. In his dissertation “The Very Idea of Modern Science”, Joseph Agassi analyses the roots of this situation in the works of Francis Bacon and Robert Boyle.

We may remember that towards the middle of the nineteenth century Auguste Comte introduced positivism explicitly as the religion of science, albeit in a somewhat new sense of the word. Nonetheless, that religion is Bacon’s doctrine of prejudice: science is the source of all progress and metaphysics is but an obstacle to it. Grosso modo, already in the eighteenth century it was the received opinion among researchers with almost no exception. (…) To spell it out, the received opinion was this. First, researchers cannot help going on discovering new facts and new theories as long as they proceed with their proper scientific research. Second, the results of their discoveries are unassailable truths. In short, the received opinion was that we possess a science-producing machine of sorts. More abstractly, the received opinion was that humanity is in possession of a science-producing machine.

The Very Idea of Modern Science, p. 16

The origin of this modern myth of science is traceable to the works of Francis Bacon, notably his “Novum Organum”, where we find fully spelled out the conception that scientific progress follows inevitably by virtue of the application of two simple rules: first, the compelte renouncement and emptying of all preconceived notions; second, the restriction and repression of the impetus towards the formation of new notions. To Bacon, the application of these two rules would enable the perfect observation of nature, pure from every intromission, from which would necessarily follow that the truth of things would configure itself naturally in thought.

Jam vero tempus est ut artem ipsam Interpretandi Naturam proponamus: in qua licet nos utilissima et verissima praecepisse arbitremur, tamen necessitatem ei absolutam (ac si absque ea nil agi possit) aut etiam perfectionem non attribuimus. Etenim in ea opinione sumus: si justam Naturae et Experientiae Historiam praesto haberent homines, atque in ea sedulo versarentur, sibique duas res imperare possent; unam, ut receptas opiniones et notiones deponerent; alteram, ut mentem a generalissimis et proximis ab illis ad tempus cohiberent; fore ut etiam vi propria et genuina mentis, absque alia arte, in formam nostram Interpretandi incidere possent. Est enim Interpretatio verum et naturale opus mentis, demptis iis quae obstant: sed tamen omnia certe per nostra praecepta erunt magis in procinctu, et multo firmiora.

Novum Organum, livro 1, aforismo 130

Every error, therefore, derives itself from the pollution of the mind by preconceived notions which one has failed to remove as required by the method. Bacon conceptualizes four forms of prejudice, by a metaphors of idolatry: adoration of the Idol of the Tribe, the impetus towards having opinions about things; adoration of the Idol of the Cavern, an innate disposition towards liking one’s own ideas; adoration of the Idol of the Marketplace, a disposition towards following current opinions; adoration of the Idol of the Theater, adoration of metaphysics. To this last one Bacon attributed the great failure of all supposed great thinkers, even Plato and Aristotle, and because of this Bacon prescribes what no educated person in the 21th century would understand as scientific: the abolition of the formation of theories and hypotheses.

It seems clear what Bacon’s ideal thinker and Crowley’s ideal sceptic have in common: both are characterized, among other things, by perfect impartiality, that is, a complete emptyness of prejudice.

The remedy prescribed by Crowley, in its “scientific method” component, is more specific: he prescribes the scientific method of verifying one’s own results. The notion of verification of results is included in the contemporary conception of science: Scienfic Proof is obtained necessarily from some other person who, through the scientific method, validates ones results. Certainly one person cannot attribute Scientific Proof to one’s own result. Consequently, it is necessary that the result be something that another person can reproduce.

According to Agassi, the institution of Reprodutibility as a necessary characteristic of modern scientific research is attributed to Robert Boyle.

The demand for the repeatability of empirical information is obtainable from the writings of Galileo and of Descartes. Boyle’s contribution was that he instituted it. Before that he stated it sharply and at length and discussed it — also at length. His institution of the demand for repeatability in the Royal Society made it a must in the whole of modern scientif c literature to date. It is possible to try to explain the failure of an unsuccessful experiment, Boyle observed. It may then be possible to test the conjecture that explains it; this test may very well turn a failed experiment into a success and the conjecture into a scientific hypothesis.

The Very Idea of Modern Science, p. 176

This was Boyle’s major problem: as he legislated for the whole commonwealth of learning, he had to offer some guidelines, but he could not go beyond the one practical guideline: what courts accept as eye-witness testimony is accepted if two independent sources testify to it and if it is taken to be repeatable.

ibid., p. 208

The modern conception of Science, in general, and the Scientific Method in particular, involves a notion that the truth is decided by testing hypotheses, that is, it emerges from the act of verifying if a certain proposition is or is not truth about the world. As the perfect sceptic of Crowley, the perfect scientist of Bacon observes the world with complete impartiality and empty of biad, obtaining from the world itself its raw testimony on what things are.

For our purposes, it is unnecessary to problematize the naivety of these notions and their progress in time; it is sufficient to note the relationship between error, its conception of prejudice or bias as a source of error, and the prescribed remedy. Starr obtains false certainty; it being false, there must be source for this error; this source is vanity which induces him to admit too easily beliefs favourable to himself, such as, for example, the belief of having magical powers.

Brainless disciples profess results by the breath of their vanity: they profess results without assuring them, confirming them. Starr announces that he had obtained the power of immunity to poison; when he is offeres strictnine, he excuses himself; when he consumes calomel, the results contradict his expectation of immunity and agree with the expectation of the purgative. In retrospect, it is evident that Starr possessed no immunity to poison.

The formation of belief, or certainty, is in the heart of the matter. In the story, Starr acquires certainty to be immune from poison. Unfortunately, events contradict his expectation: he was certain the calomel would not affect him, but, it did. He does not act maliciously, he acts naively: he submits to the test with conviction of the results. He submits to a test motivated by the doubt of another person, after making if allegations; he did not submit to the test before, motivated by a doubt of his own. His certainty is crumbles after the first test, and accessible test, involving a subtance easily obtainable whose collaretal effects are tolerable. Starr was credulous.

The only way to test clairvoyance is to keep a careful record of every experiment made. For example, Frater O.M. once gave a clairvoyant a waistcoat to psychometrize. He made 56 statements about the owner of the waistcoat; of these 4 were notably right; 17, though correct, were of that class of statement which is true of almost everybody. The remainder were wrong. It was concluded from this that he showed no evidence of any special power.

Magick in Theory and Practice, cap. 28

Facing the allegation of clairvoyance, one formulates the question — is it perhaps the case that this person has the power of obtaining information that another person would not? — and from the question derives a test. The act of verification emerges from the doubt about if this allegation is or is not the case. The presence of the doubt is the mark of the sceptic: she does not admit promply the allegation as certainty, she demands more. From his disciples, Crowley demands scepticism, not only about the allegations made by of others, but also about the allegations made by oneself. To Starr, for whatever reason, it occurred that he may have acquired the power of immunity from poison. From the absence of verification if this is or is not the case we infer that no doubt ocurred to him, that is, he progressed from an initial intuition directly to certainty, with no rigor.

The necessity of utilizing methods and tools to deal with sources of error figures proeminently in two fundamental instructions of the system of Scientific Illuminism of the A⸫ A⸫, “Liber Exercitiorum” e “Liber Manus et Sagittae”.

The time and place of all experiments must be noted; also the state of the weather, and generally all conditions which might conceivably have any result upon the experiment either as adjuvants to or causes of the result, or as inhibiting it, or as sources of error.

Liber Exercitiorum, seção 1

The student, if he attains any success in the following practices, will find himself confronted by things (ideas or beings) too glorious or too dreadful to be described. It is essential that he remain the master of all that he beholds, hears or conceives; otherwise he will be the slave of illusion, and the prey of madness. (…) There is little danger that any student, however idle or stupid, will fail to get some result; but there is great danger that he will be led astray, obsessed and overwhelmed by his results, even though it be by those which it is necessary that he should attain. (…) It is desirable that the student should never attach to any result the importance which it at first seems to possess.

Liber Manus et Sagittae, seção 1

The Record of experiments work explicitly as a mechanism for error control. It is necessary to note all factors relevant, may them be conditions of the result, that is, conditions necessary to obtain the effect observed, may them be sources of error, that is, conditions which may indice incorrect conceptions on what is being observed. In the 21th century, then whe conception of science seems to imply the use of instruments connected to computers to generated infinite series of numbers, something so poor does not pass as a scientific record. However, returning to a previous time, in the earlier stages of the formation of science, we find similar levels of rigor: we find a simpler notion of a scientific record as an honest and impartial report on facts observed. The ambition of that time is the same as now: to avoid the tendency of human subjetivity towards linking this of that trust through certain rigors capable of correcting certainties. One must apply the best instruments which are available.

The case of Meredith Starr reveals to us that the conception of Science involved in the conception of Scientific Illuminism is a simpler conception than that of the 21th century, with its technologies, its eletronics and computation, its mathematical modelling and so on. The conception which is at play involves discipline and government of the process of forming certainties through the application of rigors capable of avoiding sources of error, among them, and mainly, the idols of human thought, the tendency to like or dislike ideas, as is the case of a vain person in relation to facts favourable to himself. The person who works with the program of Scientific Illuminism must therefore cultivate scepticism, that is, the characteristic of not forming certainties, of remaining in doubt, which has the virtue of motivating tests and verifications. She must observe with complete impartialty and empty of bias all facts observed in the her record, the most basic and main instrument of her practice.

References

Aleister Crowley, “Liber LXV eith Commentary”, in “The Equinox”, volume IV, número 1, Samuel Weiser, 1996, ISBN 0877288887

Aleister Crowley, “Magick in Theory and Practice”, in “Liber ABA”, etc.

Aleister Crowley, “The Soldier and the Hunchback”, in “The Equinox”, volume I, número 1, keepsilence.org

Francis Bacon, Thomas Fowler (ed.) “Novum Organum”, McMillan and Co., Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1878; facsimile digital por Google, URL:https://books.google.com.br/books?id=N0YBAAAAQAAJ

Marilena Chauí, “Introdução à História da Filosofia”, volume 2, Companhia das Letras, 2010, ISBN 9788535917154

Joseph Agassi, “The Very Idea of Modern Science”, in “Boston Studies in the Philosophy and History of Science”, volume 298, Springer, 2013, ISBN 9789400753518